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Abstract
How tight is the conceptual connection between imagination and perception? A 
number of philosophers, from the early moderns to present-day predictive process-
ing theorists, tie the knot as tightly as they can, claiming that states of the imagina-
tion, i.e. mental imagery, are a proper subset of perceptual experience. This paper 
labels such a view ‘perceptualism’ about the imagination and supplies new argu-
ments against it. The arguments are based on high-level perceptual content and, 
distinctly, cognitive penetration. The paper also defuses a recent, influential argu-
ment for perceptualism based on the ‘discovery’ that visual perception and mental 
imagery share a significant neural substrate: circuitry in V1, the brain’s primary vis-
ual cortex. Current neuropsychology is shown to be equivocal at best on this matter. 
While experiments conducted on healthy, neurotypical subjects indicate substantial 
neural overlap, there is extensive clinical evidence of dissociations between imagery 
and perception in the brain, most notably in the case of aphantasia.
Keywords Aphantasia · Brain imaging · Cognitive penetration · High-level content · 
Imagination · Mental imagery · Predictive processing · Primary visual cortex
1 Introduction
Let us call a theory of the imagination ‘perceptualist’ just in case it claims that states 
of the imagination are a species of perceptual experience. Perceptualism about the 
imagination says that when you close your eyes and imagine a ripe, yellow banana, 
you are in a visual state—you are visualising. The view lumps states of the imagina-
tion with states of veridical perceptual representation, illusory perceptual represen-
tation and hallucinatory perceptual representation; it says that states of the imagina-
tion are a proper subset of perceptual experience, just as these other states are.
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As one might have guessed, by the term ‘imagination’ I mean the so-called 
sensory or objectual imagination, which I take to be necessarily constituted by 
mental imagery. I will have nothing to say about states of propositional imag-
ining, e.g., imagining that Liverpool is the capital city of England, and which 
may or may not involve mental imagery. Since mental imagery is an essential 
constituent of the imagination (as the term is used here) I shall sometimes help 
myself to the convenience of using the terms ‘imagination’ and ‘mental imagery’ 
interchangeably.
Here is the plan. First, I further characterise perceptualism, outlining motiva-
tions for the view and contrasting it with non-perceptual accounts of the imagina-
tion (Sect. 2). Then, I offer new arguments against perceptualism. The arguments are 
based on considerations related to high-level content (Sect. 3) and, distinctly, cogni-
tive penetration (Sect. 4). These aim to establish that there are differences between 
imagination and perception that are not mere differences in degree, but which are 
differences in representational nature. Finally, I attempt to defuse the contemporary 
master argument for perceptualism (Sect. 5) and which is based on the ‘discovery’ 
that perception and mental imagery share a significant neural substrate: V1, or the 
brain’s primary visual cortex. I shall show that current neuropsychology is equivo-
cal at best on this matter. Experimental psychology, which makes observations of 
neurotypical subjects, supports the existence of substantial neural overlap between 
perception and imagination. Yet evidence from clinical psychology, which makes 
observations of brain damaged patients, points to significant neural dissociations 
between the two, most notably in the case of aphantasia. Moreover, I’ll suggest we 
have reason to take the latter, clinical findings more seriously than the former exper-
imental ones.1
2  Perceptualism
Perceptualism says that states of the imagination are a proper subset of perceptual 
experience. By way of initially motivating the view, consider the following: veridi-
cal perceptual experiences correctly represent both objects and properties; illusory 
perceptual experiences are at one remove, correctly representing objects, but mis-
representing properties; and hallucinatory experiences are at one remove further 
still, misrepresenting both objects and properties.2
Now, we don’t have to slide down this slope much further, if at all, to meet the 
imagination. The imagination is akin to hallucination in its being causally decou-
pled from the environment, while nonetheless having a sensory phenomenal charac-
ter. Indeed, one way to be a perceptualist is to reduce hallucinations to states of the 
1 Sections 3–5 are largely independent. Readers solely interested in aphantasia and issues surrounding 
the neural substrate of mental imagery can proceed directly to Sect. 5, following Sect. 2.
2 This assumes a representational account of perceptual experience (Dretske 1995; Tye 1995). Not eve-
ryone does, but I will for the purposes of this paper. See footnote 4 for brief discussion of how naïve real-
ists typically understand imagination.
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imagination. This is precisely what Bence Nanay (2016, p.70) does when claiming 
that the hallmark of both is “perceptual processing that is not triggered by corre-
sponding sensory stimulation in the relevant sense modality.”3
Other perceptualists claim that imagination is on a continuum with perception 
more generally, rather than hallucination in particular. Here is Alex Byrne:
Visualizing a tiger is similar to seeing a tiger; auditorily imagining clashing 
cymbals is similar to hearing clashing cymbals, and so on. Why is that? The 
received view, supported by various lines of converging evidence, is that vis-
ualizing a tiger (for example) involves “visual representations”—mental rep-
resentations that are proprietary to the sense of sight; likewise for auditorily 
imagining clashing cymbals… When one visualizes a tiger, one is in a state 
with a distinctively visual content, a pared-down version of the content of the 
state of seeing a tiger. (2007, pp. 134–135)
Byrne’s use of the term ‘pared-down’ is telling. For perceptualists, any phenomenal 
difference between the imagination and perception, in terms of vivacity or what have 
you, is a mere difference in degree, not kind. Indeed, perceptualists like Nanay and 
Byrne typically downplay such differences. For instance, both take C. W. Perky’s 
(1910) infamous experiments, in which seen figures back-projected on a dimly-lit 
screen were mistaken for imagined figures, as evidence that perception and imagina-
tion can be phenomenally indistinguishable (Byrne, 2007, p. 134; Nanay, 2016, p. 
74).
Perceptualists needn’t claim that imagination and perception are necessarily 
indistinguishable. That claim is fairly implausible and is not what Byrne or Nanay 
affirm. But this concession does not threaten the perceptualist’s attempt to lump the 
imagination with hallucination, illusion and veridical perception as proper subsets 
of perceptual experience. After all, hallucinations and illusions (real ones, not the 
hypotheticals philosophers toy with) are often distinguishable from their veridi-
cal counterparts by virtue of having an air of non-reality to them. Yet this cer-
tainly doesn’t undermine the grouping of hallucination and illusion with veridical 
perceptual experience. Similarly, perceptualists can admit that imaginative states 
sometimes wear their imaginative status on their sleeves—whatever that status 
might be exactly—while still being members of a fundamental psychological kind 
whose kind-mates include hallucination, illusion and veridical perception.4 It is thus 
3 Nanay is a complicated case. In earlier work (2015), Nanay’s perceptualism is cast in terms of men-
tal states. In more recent work (2017, 2018, 2020), Nanay has switched to discussing mental imagery 
in brain processing terms. Nanay takes this to be a technical sense of ‘mental imagery’, with which he 
attempts to capture “what cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists mean by the term” (2017, p. 468) 
while nonetheless being an “extension” (2018, p.128) of the more ordinary sense, i.e. meaning ‘mental 
state.’ Nanay’s work on hallucination (2016) marks a transition between these two views; there, he at 
once defines mental imagery in processing terms (pp. 67–68) but then slides into talking about men-
tal imagery in terms of “mental states” (p. 69), particularly in relation to the representationalism versus 
naïve realism debate (p. 77), which is not a debate about processing but mental states. Nanay’s theory has 
recently been extended to olfaction (Young 2020).
4 The claim that there is such a fundamental common kind is controversial. Disjunctivists like Martin 
(2002) Soteriou (2013) deny it. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Martin and Soteriou, as we shall see below, deny 
perceptualism about the imagination too. See also Allen (2015) for an insightful discussion of disjunctiv-
ism, hallucination and the imagination.
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important to recognise that perceptualists should not be read as claiming that no 
differences exist between imagination and perception. They just think that any such 
differences are ones of mere degree.
Who else affirms perceptualism, in addition to Nanay and Byrne? The idea that 
imagination is of a kind with perception appears to be what Alvin Goldman (2006, 
p. 47) claims when he asserts that seeing O to be F and imagining O to be F are 
“a shared kind of state, in this instance a visual kind of state.” Perceptualism also 
seems implicit in Nick Wiltsher’s (2016, p. 271) claim that we can use theories of 
perceptual content, like Peacocke’s (1992) scenario and proto-propositional theory, 
to develop theories of the imagination’s content.
All told, I suspect that allegiance to perceptualism is incredibly widespread. Any-
one who thinks of imaginative states as ones that occur in the absence of appropri-
ate stimuli, as many philosophers and psychologists do, thereby implies a crucial 
similarity with illusions and hallucinations. For a state whose nature it is to occur 
in this manner is one that is pictured as partaking in the kind of mismatch between 
mind and world characteristic of these non-veridical states. Indeed, consider the 
following remarks in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s entry ‘Imagina-
tion’ (Liao & Gendler, 2019): “To have a (merely) mental image is to have a per-
ception-like experience triggered by something other than the appropriate external 
stimulus.” For it to be correct to characterise states of the imagination in relation to 
‘appropriate’ external stimuli, even if by their absence, one must be thinking about 
the imagination in broadly perceptual terms (indeed, compare the above quote from 
Nanay, 2016, p. 70).
Furthermore, it is clear when one looks back over the history of philosophy that 
perceptualism has enjoyed considerable popularity. The view is particularly evident 
in early modern writing about the imagination. Hobbes (1651/1991) analyses hal-
lucinations (‘visions’), along with memories and dreams, as imaginings, much like 
Nanay. And of course there is Hume (1739/2000), who despite claiming that imagi-
nation and perception differ in “force and liveliness” (1.1.1.1), ultimately considers 
them to belong to the same psychological kind:
That idea of red, which we form in the dark, and that impression which strikes 
our eyes in sun-shine, differ only in degree, not in nature. (1.1.1.5)
Indeed, one might reasonably call the perceptualist a ‘Humean’ about the imagina-
tion (Siegel & Silins, 2015, p. 791). More recently, predictive processing theorists 
have endorsed perceptualism too. For instance, Andy Clark (2014, p. 39) claims that 
there is a “deep unity between perceiving and imagining” and that to be a perceiver 
is to deploy, passively, the same internal states that are deployed, actively, during 
will-driven imagining. The idea of an imagination/perception knot is an enduring 
and widely affirmed one.
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Now, consider that one way to drive a wedge between perception and imagina-
tion, and thereby deny perceptualism, would be to claim that perceptual experi-
ence is distinctive in that it presents its contents as in fact thus and so, and that 
perceptual appearances are therefore appearances of actuality. The contrast with 
imagination might be that it presents its contents either as ways things are not, but 
could be; or else, following Sartre (1940/2010, p. 14), as absent or non-existent, 
as “not being.” (see also Kriegel, 2015) This would be to drive a wedge between 
imagination and perception at the level of attitude, since it is to grant that the two 
may share contents.
In contrast to this Sartrean view, consider the following remarks, again from 
Byrne, flying the flag for perceptualism:
[I]f sensuous imagination involves the appearance of anything, it’s the 
appearance of actuality, not possibility. What “appears to be so”, when one 
imagines a purple polar bear, is that purple polar bears exist, not (merely) 
that they could have existed. (Ibid., p. 134)
This is a bold claim, and I take it that not all perceptualists would necessarily 
agree. So we should perhaps say that agreeing with Byrne here is sufficient for 
being a perceptualist, but not necessary. In claiming that states of the imagination 
are a kind, or subset, of perceptual experience, perceptualists may be affirming no 
more than that states of the imagination are (1) intentional ones with (2) a sen-
sory phenomenal character that (3) rationally compel belief in a non-inferential 
manner. That is, they may leave open whether these beliefs concern actuality or 
non-actual possibility. This means that perceptualism may be an exceptionally 
broad church. Yet this is to be expected, since much depends on one’s initial take 
on perceptual experience. For instance, if we can see things to be absent (Faren-
nikova, 2013), then Sartre’s claim that imagination represents its contents as 
absent will fail to drive a wedge between the two and simply reinforce similarity.
What this all means is that the waters surrounding perceptualism are somewhat 
murky. Still, lest one think that perceptualism is too ill-defined for it to be distin-
guished from any other view, consider the so-called Dependency Thesis.
The Dependency Thesis claims that states of the imagination represent perceptual 
experiences rather than being among perceptual experience’s subsets. The difference 
between these claims might seem only slight, but it is in fact substantial. After all, 
there is typically all the difference in the world between a representation of a K and 
a K itself. A painting of a one hundred-dollar bill is not legal tender, no matter how 
realistic, and a charcoal sketch of a kitten is itself neither feline nor fluffy.
Here is how M. G. F. Martin puts the Dependency Thesis:
To imagine sensorily a Φ is to imagine experiencing a Φ… On this view, 
one kind of phenomenally conscious state, an event of imagining, takes as 
its object another type of conscious state of mind, a sensory experience. 
(2002, p. 404; see also Peacocke, 1985 and Soteriou, 2013)
This view claims that one cannot imagine objects directly. Rather, one imagines 
perceptual experiences of objects. This, Martin claims, is reflected in imagery’s 
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including a point of view as a part of its content and from which the imagination 
takes place, e.g., from above, below, etc. (p. 407). Whereas Sartrean accounts 
disagree with perceptualists about attitudinal features of the sensory imagina-
tion, defenders of the Dependency Thesis disagree with perceptualists about the 
contents of sensory imaginings. The Dependency Thesis claims that the contents 
of such imaginings are perceptual experiences while the contents of percep-
tual experiences are objects and their properties. As a result, defenders of the 
Dependency Thesis give a contrasting account of how perception and imagination 
aim at truth, claiming that perceptual experiences aim to be faithful to the nature 
of external objects while the imagination aims to be faithful to possible percep-
tual experiences (Soteriou, 2013, ch.7).5
A third way to deny perceptualism is to place states of the imagination firmly on 
the side of the cognitive. As John Zeimbekis (2015, p. 298) points out, this is the 
view commonly assumed in the so-called imagery debate (see Pylyshyn, 1999, p. 
347). Why would one hold such a view? Suppose one agrees with so-called stimu-
lus-based or stimulus-controlled accounts of the perceptual that perceptual experi-
ences necessarily function to represent particular individuals in the here and now. 
On this criterion, imagination will come out as non-perceptual. As Ben Phillips 
(2019, p. 319) explains: “In contrast to hallucinations, voluntary images do not even 
function so as to represent the environment in a stimulus-controlled manner.” (See 
also Beck, 2018, p. 319) The crucial point is that although perceptualism may come 
in a number of flavours, it can be clearly distinguished from at least three views 
that are, or at least entail, non-perceptual analyses of the sensory imagination: (1) 
Sartrean accounts of the imagination, (2) the Dependency Thesis6 and (3) stimulus-
based accounts of the perceptual.
Having characterised the key commitments of perceptualism and distinguished 
it from rival views, I shall now offer two new arguments against it (Sects. 3 and 4). 
Following that, I will defuse the contemporary master argument for perceptualism; 
namely, that mental imagery and perception share a neural substrate in the form of 
the early visual cortex (Sect. 5).
5 Two points are worth emphasising when it comes to understanding the relationship between percep-
tualism and the Dependency Thesis. First, strictly speaking, the Dependency Thesis is compatible with 
the claim that imagination is a type of perceptual experience. (A state of kind K may be represented by a 
state of kind K.) But a more natural way to understand the view, and indeed how it is pictured by Byrne 
(2007, n.18), is as claiming that imagination and perception are members of fundamentally distinct psy-
chological kinds. Nanay (2015), in offering several arguments against the Dependency Thesis, also sees 
it as a rival to perceptualism.
 Second, when interpreting past thinkers, like Hobbes and Hume, one should be careful to bear in mind 
the distinction between perceptualism and the Dependency Thesis. Indeed, as Fabian Dorsch (2016, pp. 
41–44) argues, it does not take much tinkering with Hume’s view to transform it from the former into the 
latter. My own view is that it may be more accurate to say that Hume unwittingly equivocated between 
perceptualism and the Dependency Thesis.
6 My considered view is that the Dependency Thesis is just as problematic as perceptualism (see Cave-
don-Taylor forthcoming, where I call the Dependency Thesis ‘weak perceptualism’), but in this paper I 
focus solely on advancing the case against perceptualism. Readers may correctly surmise from Sect. 5 
that I am sympathetic to stimulus-based views of the perceptual.
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3  Perceptualism and high‑level content
Take first the debate over whether perceptual experience has high-level content. 
The issue is whether perceptual experience represents objects as having only 
basic, low-level properties, e.g., color, shape, motion, spatial orientation, etc. or 
whether it can also represent objects as having so-called high-level properties, 
e.g., natural kind properties, causal properties, psychological properties, action 
properties, etc.
Suppose I look into my garden and see a bird land on the fence and then 
quickly take flight when it spies the neighbour’s cat approach through the grass. 
What information do I get here from vision alone, prior to forming any beliefs 
about what I see? High-level views might say: I see there to be a pigeon on my 
fence, or the cat’s causing the pigeon to flee, or the cat’s having the intention to 
pounce, and so on. Low level views might say: I see there to be a grey object 
located on a rectangular, brown object with an orange object moving towards it, 
etc. On that view, the properties, ‘being a pigeon’, ‘being a cat’, ‘being a fence 
panel’, ‘causing’, and ‘intending’ are represented post-perceptually, if not in 
belief proper, then in some other post-perceptual state (Reiland, 2014).
The issue has generated substantial debate. If low-level views are right, then 
the representational capacity of perception is greatly attenuated, compared to 
belief. (Belief can represent all manner of high-level properties, having almost 
no restrictions here.) If high-level views are right, then the gulf is not so wide. 
Moreover, the truth of high-level views opens up space for fully perceptual, a 
posteriori analyses of our knowledge of, e.g., other minds, moral rightness, etc. If 
low-level views are correct, then the prospects for such views is dim.
As a matter of sociological fact, high-level views are more widely affirmed 
than low-level ones. (A small sample: Bayne, 2009; Block, 2014; Brogaard, 2016; 
Fish, 2013; Matey, 2014; Nanay, 2011; Siegel, 2006; Stokes, 2018a.) But low-
level views have several capable defenders (Byrne, 2016; Price, 2009; Tye, 1995). 
Moreover, the low-level view has, I think, been the more central view historically. 
Although high-level views currently dominate, the matter shouldn’t be considered 
cut and dried.
So we have here  a ‘live’ debate. Yet when we frame the issue in terms of 
whether states of the imagination have high-level content, the issue seems sub-
stantially less interesting. For the claim that one can literally see high-level prop-
erties, like an object’s being a cat or being about to pounce, is potentially prob-
lematic in ways that the claim one can visualise an object to have such properties 
is intuitively not (see also Gregory, 2013, pp. 84–5). Indeed, here is Byrne (2007) 
affirming, without argument, that the imagination has high-level content:
The content of sensuous imagination is not restricted to simple arrange-
ments of shapes, colors, sounds, and so on: that a small red ball is on top of 
a large blue cube, for instance. We can also sensuously imagine that King’s 
College is on fire, that a tiger is stalking the Queen, that Nixon is inanimate, 
and so on. (p. 136)
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In fact, Byrne seems happy to populate states of the imagination with high-level 
content of a fairly unrestricted sort, making imagination exceptionally close to belief 
in its representational powers. He continues:
[O]ne may imagine the piano being made of ice, being the offspring of Mr. 
and Mrs. Truman, turning into a butterfly and flying up the stairs, or whatever. 
(Ibid.)
 I will grant, for the sake of argument, Byrne’s assumption that the imagination has 
high-level content.7 My strategy for arguing against perceptualism will be on the 
basis of some aspects of the high-level content debate itself.
The argument from high-level content
1. If perceptualism is true, then putative grounds for denying that perceptual expe-
rience has high-level content are putative grounds for denying that states of the 
imagination have high-level content.
2. Putative grounds for denying that perceptual experience has high-level content 
are not putative grounds for denying that states of the imagination have high-level 
content.
3. Perceptualism is not true.
I take 1 to be entailed by perceptualism. If states of the imagination are a proper 
subset of perceptual experience, then challenges facing a high-level view of percep-
tual content will, ipso facto, be challenges for a high-level view of the imagination’s 
content. Whether those challenges are only prima facie or are instead sufficient 
grounds for rejecting the high-level view of perception won’t concern me. (Hence 
I call them only putative grounds.) Premise 2 says that challenges to perception’s 
having high-level content have no application to imagination’s having high-level 
content. If true, this seems evidence of a substantial asymmetry between perception 
and imagination, one that does not constitute a mere difference in degree, but a dif-
ference in kind; specifically, it points to a difference in representational natures. The 
conclusion is that perceptualism is false: states of the imagination, mental imagery 
in particular, are not a subset of perceptual experience; the two are not on a substan-
tial continuum with one another nor members of the same fundamental psychologi-
cal kind (though they may of course share many properties in common). In sum, I 
argue below that challenges to perception’s having high-level content have no rel-
evance as to whether the imagination has high-level content, suggesting that the two 
are quite different kinds of psychological state.
So what are some putative grounds for denying that perceptual experience has 
high-level content and that fail to apply to the imagination? Where, that is, is the 
evidence for 2?
7 Peter Kung (2010, p. 625) outlines a framework for thinking about the imagination’s content on which 




First, one key reason for resisting the claim that perception has high-level content 
is that this entails there are perceptual illusions of high-level properties, something 
many have found unpalatable. Here is Byrne yet again, this time supporting a low-
level view of perceptual content on such grounds:
Visual illusions, as the object of study in the visual sciences, concern proper-
ties like shape, motion, colour, shading, orientation and the like, not properties 
like being tired, belonging to Smith or being a lemon. There is thus no imme-
diate reason to take (visual) perceptual content to include the proposition that 
o is a lemon, and the like. (2009, p. 449)8
A related way of pressing the point is to claim that a visual experience that correctly 
represents all of an object’s low-level properties is, necessarily, a veridical visual 
experience (Logue, 2013, pp. 5–6 though they are ultimately unpersuaded). But 
high-level views deny this. They leave open the possibility that a visual experience 
which is veridical in terms of its low-level properties might nonetheless be illusory 
if, e.g., a high-level property is misrepresented. This seems how a high-level theorist 
must think of matters when a mature perceiver sees, e.g., a realistic plastic banana 
in standard viewing conditions. In such a situation, the perceiver’s visual experience 
is likely to correctly represent all of the object’s low-level properties, i.e. the colours 
and shapes, yet will likely misrepresent the object as having a natural kind prop-
erty, i.e. being a banana. This result seems troubling for the high-level view. Intui-
tively, the situation described above isn’t illusory, at least not in a strictly perceptual 
sense. (It is more tempting to think that any error on the perceiver’s part will be in 
belief alone, i.e. the perceiver will mistakenly believe that the object before them is a 
banana while their visual experience is error-free.) However one chooses to think of 
the problem, the objection is that high-level views stretch our concept of ‘perceptual 
illusion’ beyond its intuitive breaking points.
Yet this objection has no analogue in the case of mental imagery’s potentially 
having high-level content. The objection is founded on the idea that perceptual 
experiences are faulty when they fail to match the world, that there’s something 
defective, epistemically, about illusions and hallucinations as such. But this is not 
necessarily the case when it comes to the imagination. For instance, at home on a 
Sunday afternoon in winter, I may spontaneously visualise myself as being, at that 
very moment, on a sunny beach abroad. This situation, so described, is not epistemi-
cally problematic in the way that a sudden hallucination of being on a beach, or an 
illusory experience of the red carpet as golden and sandy, clearly is. In the latter 
two situations, something is wrong with me, and the precise respect is perceptually 
(perhaps also cognitively). But it does not follow that there is anything wrong with 
me (perceptually, cognitively or otherwise) in suddenly visualising myself on a hot 
8 I challenge Byrne’s claim that there are no perceptual illusions of high-level properties in Cavedon-
Taylor (2021). I believe that the rubber-hand illusion, an object of study of perceptual psychology, sup-
plies evidence to the contrary.
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sunny beach when the temperature is, in fact, in the minuses and the sky overcast. 
Thus, the norms governing epistemic (and perhaps broader psychological) appropri-
ateness differ quite radically across perception and imagination.
Crucially, even when imagery does aim to match one’s environment, a mismatch 
between properties imaginatively represented and properties actually instantiated is 
not classified as an illusion. This is not the result that one should get, if percep-
tualism is true. For instance, suppose you are driving at night in foggy conditions 
along a narrow road. Thankfully, no other cars are out. Still, the route is precarious. 
Suddenly, a car appears on the road. At least, you assume it to be one; all you can 
visually discern are two headlights. To work out whether there is space for the cars 
to pass on the narrow lane, you must make an educated guess as to the shape of 
the other car, given the position of the headlights. But you need to do so in such a 
way that can directly guide your action. Solution: you imaginatively project, out into 
the pitch-black, the outline shape of a car that strikes you as being the correct size. 
(Whether this is a matter of representing only low-level properties, i.e. those corre-
sponding to the outline shape of the car, or is also or instead a matter of representing 
high-level properties, i.e. the shape to be that of a car part, doesn’t matter.)
Suppose, however, that you get the proportions disastrously wrong (and so crash). 
Then, the image projected was in error. The error is in terms of the properties your 
mental imagery represented as instantiated in the external world. If imaginative 
states are of a kind with perceptual states, then this would be a case of illusion, or 
at least something very close to it. Yet one would not speak here of a visual illusion 
or of a mis-seeing of the car’s shape. (The problem was precisely that you couldn’t 
visually experience these properties!) Thus, supposing that there are no perceptual 
illusions of high-level properties, this fact may threaten high-level views of percep-
tual content, but not high-level views of the imagination’s content (no more, at least, 
than the idea that belief can represent such properties). When imagery misrepresents 
properties in the world, as when belief misrepresents such properties, ‘illusion’ is 
not the word to begin with. Thus, populating the imagination with high-level content 
does not, while populating perception with such content does, have relevance for the 
scope of perceptual illusions. This shows a significant difference in the representa-
tional nature of perceptual experience and mental imagery.
3.2  Doppelgangers
Another key reason for resisting the claim that perceptual experience has high-level 
content, but which has no analogue in the case of mental imagery, concerns percep-
tual doppelgangers. This argument can be pressed a number of ways (Bayne, 2009 
discusses several variants). A simple version is presented by Michael Tye:
It seems plausible to suppose that the property of being a tiger is not itself a 
feature represented [perceptually]. Our sensory states do not track this feature. 
There might conceivably be creatures other than tigers that look to us phenom-
enally just like tigers. (1995, p.141)
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Tye’s thought is that high-level properties, natural kinds in particular, are not repre-
sented by perception since our perceptual systems are not sensitive to their instantia-
tions, as they are the instantiations of low-level properties. Our visual systems are 
“tuned” (p. 142) to the comings and goings of colour, shape, motion, etc. but not the 
genetic essences constitutive of natural kinds; visual phenomenology, in the normal 
course of things, changes in the face of variations to the former but not the latter. 
Indeed, it seems that one’s visual phenomenology would fail to differ between a sit-
uation in which tigers were before one’s eyes and a situation in which twigers were 
instead present. (Twigers, we may suppose, are creatures that happen to share  all 
low-level properties with tigers while being a distinct species.) If this is right, then 
objects that are look-alikes in terms of low-level properties should be considered 
look-alikes simpliciter, leaving no room for high-level properties to figure in per-
ceptual content. Again, however, this worry has no analogue in the case of mental 
imagery that would prevent such states from representing high-level properties. I 
take this to be further evidence of a representational difference between the two.
Here’s why the worry doesn’t carry over to the imagination. In the case of per-
ception, high-level properties are either represented in the same bottom-up, stimu-
lus-driven way that low-level properties like colour, shape, motion, etc. are, or (as is 
more likely) as a matter of cognitive penetration, i.e. a top-down effect of standing 
beliefs, desires, expectations, etc. on perception (more on that later). In either case, 
however, perception comes to represent high-level properties in an involuntary man-
ner. Although cognitive penetration involves acquired cognitive contents altering 
perceptual contents, such effects on perception are largely automatic, involving an 
unwilled ‘leaking’ of such contents into perception.9
With states of the imagination, things are different. When Tye complains that the 
visual system is insufficiently ‘tuned’ to the genetic essence constitutive of natural 
kinds in order to represent such properties, this is not a problem in the case of the 
imagination. For, regardless of whether the imagination sometimes acquires content 
from causal interactions with the environment in the bottom-up way that percep-
tion typically does, there is another manner by which the imagination can acquire 
content, and which is unavailable to perception, at least in the case of representing 
natural kinds: by being responsive to one’s intention to represent such-and-such a 
natural kind. For instance, I can imagine two suitably-striped creatures side-by-side, 
represent the creature on the left to be a tiger, the one on the right to be a twiger, 
and then reverse this as I please. Similarly, I can imagine two glasses of clear liq-
uid next to one another, and represent one to be water, composed of  H2O, and the 
other to be twater, composed of XYZ; I can again freely reverse this assignation as 
I choose, or refrain from doing so. This might be thought to involve an accompany-
ing propositional imagining acting on the image content, a form of imagining I have 
claimed can be put aside. However, given that the relevant propositional imagining 
would itself acquire content from a suitable “content-conveying intention” (Noord-
hoff, 2002, p. 430), it is not clear why propositional imagining must be appealed to 
here and why intention shouldn’t be pictured as acting directly on imagery content.
9 An exception might be when mental imagery is voluntarily projected into perception, as in the driving 
example, though such projection can also occur involuntarily.
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Thus, the problem of doppelgangers, of perception’s being unable to discriminate 
between objects that are members of distinct natural kinds that are nonetheless iden-
tical in terms of low-level properties, has no analogue in the case of the imagination. 
Tye’s worry arises only insofar as perceptually representing an object to fall under a 
natural kind is a matter of discriminating that natural kind. By contrast, as the above 
example illustrates, representing an object to fall under a natural kind imaginatively 
is (at least sometimes) a matter of intention-based designation, not discernment, of 
that natural kind, preventing Tye’s worry from getting a foothold.10
Now, the idea that imagination bears a necessary connection to the will that per-
ception does not is a common way to distinguish the two. The strategy is associ-
ated with both Sartre (1940/2010) and Wittgenstein (1948/1980) and continues to be 
defended today (see Kind, 2020, Sect. 3 for discussion). Imagining, so it goes, is an 
activity, something we do; we conjure images when we imagine. Perception, by con-
trast, is said to be something that merely happens to us and in which we are passive, 
receiving input from the world.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, perceptualists push back. They point out the sometimes-
passive nature of the imagination, appealing to examples of unbidden imagery, 
memory flashbacks and ‘earworms’ (Nanay, 2016, p. 66). This line of argument 
can be bolstered further by focussing on perceptual experiences that bear a neces-
sary connection to the will and are not particularly passive. Consider, e.g., visu-
ally switching aspect on the Necker cube; listening out for a noise; sniffing to tell if 
that stink has gone yet; and the exploratory actions that are partially constitutive of 
haptic/exploratory touch. These perceptual activities give rise to perceptual experi-
ences that are will-driven. It thus seems that we can upend entirely the supposed 
active/passive contrast said to hold between imagination and perception, and which I 
appealed to above in order to argue that Tye’s worry about perception’s having high-
level content has no application to the imagination.
But we should be careful here to distinguish at least three separate issues: the 
extent to which perceptions and imaginations can be instantiated via the will, extin-
guished via the will and have their contents controlled via the will. In discussion of 
the problem of doppelgangers, I have appealed only to the last of these, and not even 
in full generality, suggesting that with imagination we can represent natural (and 
perhaps artefactual) kinds by fiat, something we seem unable to do in the case of 
perception. This is entirely compatible with there being other respects in which there 
is no great difference between how imagination and perception relate to the will. 
For instance, the fact that some imaginative states, like earworms, are involuntarily 
instantiated and that some perceptual experiences, like tactual ones, are voluntarily 
instantiated, does not threaten the precise respect, outlined above, in which there is 
this asymmetry between imagination and perception: if we can represent high-level 
10 Compare Kathleen Stock (ms. p. 16), coming at the same issue from a slightly different angle: “There 
is apparently no analogous gap between, as one might put it, the surface appearances of the image—what 
it seems to the thinker to be of—and what, she has reason to believe, it is really of. That is, there is 
apparently no possibility that one’s current ‘image array’, as it were, is simultaneously caused by some 
unexpected object or another entity.” Some of the details of this paper are discussed in Wiltsher (2016).
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properties, then we can freely do so in the case of the imagination, but not percep-
tion.11 Crucially, this difference might seem only slight, were we not considering the 
matter against the background of the high-level contents debate. For the difference 
exposes high-level views of perception, but not high-level views of the imagination, 
to the problem of doppelgangers. Crucially, this thereby illustrates a difference in 
the representational nature of the imagination and perception, suggesting that we are 
dealing with a difference in kind and not degree.
4  Perceptualism and cognitive penetration
Reflecting on the high-level content debate is not the only way that we can drive 
a wedge between imagination and perceptual experience. We can also do so via 
reflecting on the question of whether perceptual experience is cognitively penetra-
ble. This is the matter of whether non-perceptual states like belief, desire, etc. ever 
produce a direct affect upon perceptual content. Those who claim that perceptual 
experience is cognitively penetrable claim that it can. Those who deny the cognitive 
penetrability thesis claim that the effect of cognitive states on perception is either 
pre-perceptual, determining, e.g., the spatial allocation of perceptual attention, or 
else is post-perceptual, determining, e.g., what beliefs one is disposed to form on the 
basis of perceptual experience (Pylyshyn, 1999).
By way of illustration, consider the following: in experimental conditions, sub-
jects who were led to believe that samples of meat originated from factory-farmed 
animals rated them as tasting saltier than did subjects who were led to believe that 
identical samples originated from humanely-farmed animals (Anderson & Barrett, 
2016). Question: in the first group, did their belief that the meat samples were from 
factory farmed animals literally make the meat taste saltier than it would have oth-
erwise? Those who affirm the cognitive penetrability thesis reply ‘yes’, those who 
deny it claim ‘no’. The naysayers will reply that the belief about the meat’s origin 
either altered how those in the first group allocated their gustatory attention, e.g., 
causing them to selectively pick up on properties that they wouldn’t have otherwise, 
or else the belief induced by the experimenters disposed members of the group 
to judge the samples particularly salty, with gustatory experience itself uniform 
between the two groups.
Like the question of whether perception has high-level content, the question of 
perception’s cognitive penetrability is controversial. Many experimental studies 
advanced as evidence of cognitive penetration seem poorly designed, either suffer-
ing failures of replicability or else having been found vulnerable to interference or 
task-demand effects (Firestone & Scholl, 2016; Machery, 2015). Crucially, intro-
spective evidence is of little help to adjudicate matters here. Introspection lacks the 
keenness to distinguish cognition’s affecting either (1) the pre-perceptual alloca-
tion of attention; (2) perceptual content itself (i.e. cognitive penetration); (3) what 
11 Compare Tim Bayne (2009, p. 395): “It does not matter what one believes about an object; it still 
looks like a pipe, a stethoscope, or a cigarette lighter.”.
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post-perceptual judgements one has formed; or (4) some combination of all three. 
Matters are not helped by the fact that (1)–(3) occur within split-seconds of each 
other.
As with the question of high-level content, when we switch to framing the ques-
tion of cognitive penetration in terms of whether the imagination is cognitively 
penetrable, the issue again seems much less controversial. Although there may be 
some cases when imagery is produced in a stimulus-driven way, mental imagery 
frequently takes as its informational input the contents of our cognitive states. In 
general, what we believe about an F will obviously affect how we imagine an F to 
be. In imagining a red apple, mechanisms of imagery generation will have to draw 
on content from standing beliefs, memories, etc. about red apples. Ditto for imagin-
ing giraffes, a desert landscape, the Eiffel Tower, etc.
With these remarks in mind, the remainder of this section will be dedicated to 
motivating and defending the following argument against perceptualism.
The argument from cognitive penetration:
4. If perceptualism is true, then the cognitive penetrability of the imagination is 
relevant for the question of perception’s cognitive penetrability.
5. The cognitive penetrability of the imagination is not relevant for the question of 
perception’s cognitive penetrability.
6. Perceptualism is not true.
As before, I take 4 to be entailed by perceptualism. If the imagination, mental 
imagery in particular, is a perceptual state, and if states of the imagination are cogni-
tively penetrable, then this fact must be relevant for the question of whether percep-
tion is cognitively penetrable. Premise 5 denies the consequent of that conditional: 
the fact that imagination is cognitively penetrable is neither here nor there when it 
comes to assessing whether perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable, a mat-
ter on which I remain neutral throughout. Again, the conclusion, that perceptual-
ism is false, follows swiftly. If the penetrability of imagination has no bearing on 
whether perception is cognitively penetrable, then perception and imagination must 
be members of quite different kinds of psychological state. As with the previous 
argument, the premise requiring support is 5. I shall attempt to do so via reflecting 
on both the terms of the penetrability debate and some of the alleged consequences 
of cognitive penetration.
4.1  The terms of the penetrability debate
Whether or not perception is cognitively penetrable, we have good reason to think 
that the imagination is. With this in mind, it might be tempting for friends of cog-
nitive penetration to leverage perceptualism about the imagination to support their 
case, citing mental imagery as a counterexample to perception’s impenetrability. As 
it happens, a situation like this has played out in both the philosophical and psycho-
logical literatures. Philosophy: Jesse Prinz (2006, p. 31) claims that mental imagery 
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represents the “most obvious case” of cognition penetrating perception, since it 
involves cognitive states being “actively used to construct perceptual representa-
tions.” Psychology: in response to Firestone and Scholl’s (2016) critique of experi-
mental results said to support cognitive penetrability, Howe and Carter (2016, p. 
38) object with essentially the same point; perception is cognitively penetrable, they 
claim, since mental imagery is “obviously” cognitively penetrable.
What should we make of this inference from the cognitive penetrability of imagi-
nation to the cognitive penetrability of perception? Two objections are as follows, 
reflection on which support premise 5 of the above argument.
First, inferring perception’s penetrability from imagination’s penetrability would 
significantly trivialise the question of the penetrability of perception. The thesis that 
perception is cognitively penetrable is a highly divisive matter, from both philosoph-
ical and experimental perspectives. It is implausible that it should be resolved with 
a mere stroke of the pen. Yet this is how matters would stand if perceptualism were 
true, and states of the imagination were correctly classified as perceptual in nature. 
Thus, consider the question, “Is perception cognitively penetrable?” Prinz and Howe 
and Carter are right to claim that there is an obvious answer if states of the imagina-
tion count as perceptual states: perceptual experience counts as cognitively penetra-
ble by virtue of the imagination being cognitively penetrable. But this very fact of 
‘obviousness’ should alert us to the implausibility of characterising imagery as a 
perceptual state to begin with. Vigorous debate in both philosophy and psychology 
surrounding the question of perception’s penetrability is evidence that the question 
lacks an obvious answer, and that mental imagery’s penetrability by cognition is nei-
ther here nor there as far as perception’s penetrability is concerned.
Second, inferring the penetrability of perception from the penetrability of 
imagery is to fail to engage with a key issue regarding the cognitive penetrability 
thesis. Consider how one of the chief sceptics about cognitive penetrability, Zenon 
Pylyshyn, and who is responsible for coining the term, frames the thesis. Pylyshyn is 
clear that by defending perception’s impenetrability his thesis is not that no percep-
tual state is cognitively impenetrable, only that some are; namely, those belonging to 
early vision, a process which generates states representing basic sensory properties, 
e.g., edges, volumes and so-called 2.5-D depth relations. Consider:
The early vision system is encapsulated from cognition, or to use the terms we 
prefer, it is cognitively impenetrable. Since vision as a whole is cognitively 
penetrable, this leaves open the question of where the cognitive penetration 
occurs. (1999, p. 344)
Other sceptics about cognitive penetrability follow suit in limiting their thesis to 
early vision (Raftopoulos, 2009). This is important. It means that if the imagination 
is cognitively penetrable, then that can have no impact on the cognitive penetrability 
debate, classically understood. Mental imagery, even if correctly classified as a per-
ceptual state, would not count as an output of early vision.
So, we have support here for premise 5: the cognitive penetrability of the imagi-
nation has no bearing on the question of the cognitive penetrability of perception 
since there is no quick route to defending the penetrability of perception on the 
basis of the penetrability of the imagination. Yet the cognitive penetrability of the 
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imagination should have at least some bearing on the question of the cognitive pen-
etrability of perception, if perceptualism were true, and states of the imagination 
were a subset of perceptual experience.
4.2  Consequentialism about cognitive penetration
Cognitive penetration is standardly characterised as a causal influence that cogni-
tive states have on perceptual ones. Further matters remain to be settled, since not 
all causal effects of cognition on perception would seem to count. Let us define two 
opposing camps.
First, let us call a semanticist about cognitive penetration someone who, fol-
lowing Pylyshyn (1999) and Fiona Macpherson (2012), holds that the changes to 
perceptual content that result from cognition must be semantically coherent ones. 
Cognitive content must alter perceptual content in a rationally comprehensible way. 
Adapting an example of Macpherson’s, it’s not cognitive penetration if your belief 
that you have an important exam today causes light to flicker in your field of vision. 
Yet it might be, if your belief that there will be a thunderstorm today were to have 
the same effect.
Second, and following Dustin Stokes (2015), let us call a consequentialist about 
cognitive penetration someone who holds that the changes to perceptual content that 
result from cognition needn’t be semantically coherent, but must instead have cer-
tain consequences. Which consequences? Stokes’s preferred ones are given in the 
following, disjunctive definition:
ψ is cognitive penetration if and only if ψ is a cognitive-perceptual relation that 
implies consequences for theory-ladenness or the epistemic role of perception 
or mental architecture. (p. 92)12
The definition supplies a useful tool to test whether the cognitive penetrability of 
imagination counts as an instance of the cognitive penetrability of perception, as it 
should if perceptualism is true. From the consequentialist perspective: if perceptual-
ism is true, then the cognitive penetrability of the imagination should have conse-
quences for either the theory-ladenness of perception, or the epistemic role of per-
ception or mental architecture.
Take first the theory-ladenness of perception. If perception is cognitively pen-
etrable, then scientific observation risks being unable to adjudicate between rival 
theories. Rather, what the scientist sees, whether with the naked eye, through the tel-
escope, or whatever, will simply reflect their prior theory. Thus, Jerry Fodor (1984) 
complains that the cognitive penetrability of perception will threaten the objectivity 
and theory-neutrality of perception.
The second consequence, the epistemic role of perception, is a generalisation of 
the first. If perception is cognitively penetrable, then what we (laypeople) see also 
risks being a function of what we expect or desire or believe we will see. Yet if 
12 Compare Athanassios Raftopoulos (2017, np), another consequentialist: “whether some causal influ-
ence on perception counts as cognitive penetrability one should examine the effects of these influences.”
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perception is to be of epistemic value at all, it must track the facts before us, not our 
prior beliefs/suspicions about those facts. Perception’s key epistemic role is to cor-
rect false beliefs, but if it is cognitively penetrable by beliefs, then it will risk simply 
reinforcing these.
The third consequence, regarding mental architecture, concerns how perceptual 
systems and processing relate to cognitive systems and processing. Take vision. If 
visual experience is cognitively penetrable, then visual systems are not modular 
(Fodor, 1983); that is, they do not perform proprietary computations on input from 
the retina, preparing its ‘raw data’ for computations by distinct, domain general 
cognitive systems. On the modular view, the flow of information between sensory 
surfaces, visual systems and cognitive systems is a one-way street, with visual sys-
tems ‘dumbly’ offering up patterns of retinal information to thought. Contrastingly, 
if vision is cognitively penetrable, then the flow of information between visual and 
cognitive systems is a bidirectional exchange, with the former drawing on cognition 
as an informational resource when preparing the retina’s raw data and sending it on 
to cognition.
As Stokes points out, the idea that perceptual states are cognitively penetrable 
is traditionally thought to have exactly these three consequences. Indeed, sceptics 
often rally against cognitive penetration because they find these consequences to be 
unpalatable or simply false. But saying that the imagination is cognitively penetrable 
seems not to have these consequences at all. This is further support for premise 5 of 
the Argument from Cognitive Penetration.
Take the first two consequences. Claiming that states of imagination are cogni-
tively penetrable, i.e. that imagining an F takes beliefs, memories, etc. about Fs as 
one of its inputs, does not threaten to rob us of our power to adjudicate between 
scientific theories via observation, nor can it rob perception of its more general epis-
temic cache. Given that the cognitive penetrability of the imagination is a seemingly 
unassailable fact, to hold otherwise would be to affirm that there is an in-principled 
conflict between the imagination and perception’s epistemic functions. But the mere 
existence of imaginative states clearly does not have this as a consequence, even if, 
in highly-controlled experimental conditions, some perceptual states are mistaken 
for states of the imagination (Perky, 1910).
In terms of the third consequence, concerning mental architecture, the fact that 
states of the imagination are cognitively penetrable has no bearing on how visual 
systems handle retinal input. Whether the computations performed on raw, retinal 
data are proprietary to vision, or whether, in performing such computations, cogni-
tive states are drawn on as informational resources, e.g., to resolve ambiguity, is not 
affected by the imagination being cognitively penetrated. States of the imagination 
can be as saturated with content from beliefs, desires, expectations, etc. as one’s 
theory would like, and such architectural issues would remain entirely untouched.
Granted, the consequentialist perspective is just one way of thinking about cogni-
tive penetration. Moreover, Stokes himself shies away from the idea that his disjunc-
tive definition should be used to deliver verdicts on specific cases. So I don’t take the 
lines of argument developed in this sub-section to be conclusive against perceptual-
ism. (Indeed, as one can hopefully see, I take there to be multiple reasons to reject 
the view, so the case against it here is somewhat cumulative). But consequentialism 
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does have certain strengths. Notably, and as Stokes points out, there are certain prof-
fered cases of cognitive penetration in the literature, like the experiments conducted 
by Bruner and Goodman (1947), that only consequentialism, not semanticism, can 
accommodate for. Moreover, independent of the truth of consequentialism, it is 
plainly significant for the case against perceptualism that the cognitive penetrability 
of the imagination is neutral with respect to the key consequences alleged to follow 
from perception’s penetrability, and which trouble sceptics so much. That this is so 
suggests that the cognitive penetrability of the imagination is not an instance of the 
cognitive penetrability of perception, independent of whether consequentialism is 
the correct account of the nature of cognitive penetration. This amounts to further 
support for premise 5 of The Argument from Cognitive Penetrability, thereby sup-
porting the anti-perceptualist conclusion that imagination and perception are funda-
mentally distinct.
It might be argued that the two considerations I have offered in this paper against 
perceptualism are more fundamentally explained by the difference between percep-
tion and imagery being a causal one; the former is generated in a bottom-up, stimu-
lus-driven manner while the latter is a matter of top-down processing (see Briscoe, 
2011, pp. 164–165). Although I am sympathetic to this line of thought, I have hinted 
throughout that I believe this picture is too stark and doesn’t hold in full generality. 
For one, there is evidence that attention penetrates visual experience itself, rather 
than operating pre- or post-perceptually (Mole, 2015; Stokes, 2018b). If this is cor-
rect, then perceiving is partially top-down. In the case of mental imagery, there is 
evidence that this can be triggered crossmodally, in a bottom-up, stimulus-driven 
manner that involves neither concepts nor cognition (Deroy & Spence, 2013, p. 
165).13
The more crucial matter, however, is conceptual: it must be remembered that the 
‘perceptual’  in ‘perceptualism’ doesn’t mean ‘veridical perception’ but ‘perceptual 
experience’. So included here are non-veridical experiences, like illusion and hal-
lucination. This makes all the difference. Indeed, as mentioned at the start of this 
paper, some perceptualists, like Nanay, take hallucination to be imagery’s closest 
relative, and hallucinations are certainly not (if at all) triggered in a bottom-up man-
ner. So, the claim that imagery and perception can be distinguished on the basis 
that imagery is (always? mostly?) a matter of top-down processing and perceptual 
experience is (always? mostly?) a matter of bottom-up processing would need to 
be severely qualified to make room for the perceptual experiences that imagery is 
claimed by some perceptualists to be most akin to. Qualifications made, I suspect 
that whatever residual, bottom-up/top-down differences remain (if any) will be 
insufficient to motivate a difference in kind rather than mere degree.
13 The fact that some mental imagery is cognitively penetrated doesn’t mean all is.
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5  The shared neural substrate argument
So much for the two new arguments against perceptualism. But these can per-
haps have only limited success in the overall case against perceptualism since 
they leave untouched what has recently emerged as the master argument for the 
view. Like the anti-perceptualist arguments developed above, this pro-perceptu-
alist argument is one that could only have developed recently, certainly not dur-
ing Hobbes’s or Hume’s time. But rather than being based on current trends in 
philosophy of mind and perception, this argument is based on a current trend in 
cognitive neuropsychology: research concerning the neural substrate of mental 
imagery.
For instance, in discussion of whether perception and imagination “have anything 
substantial in common or whether they are radically different”, Bence Nanay (2016, 
p. 73) argues for the former on the grounds that neuropsychology has shown that 
visual perception and visual mental imagery share significant neural substrates:
[T]here is an almost complete overlap between the brain regions involved 
in perception and the brain regions involved in mental imagery, which sug-
gests that the mental processes that make perception possible are the very 
same mental processes that make mental imagery possible. (Ibid.)
Likewise, Andy Clark, in his defence of the predictive processing approach to 
perception, claims that “perception and imagination are simply different ways of 
deploying the very same circuits and fundamental capacities.” (2014, p. 39) Clark 
even goes so far as to claim that “imagery and perception are not simply acti-
vating overlapping neural areas but are actually deploying the very same fine-
grained internal representations when they do.” (n. 16).
Alvin Goldman (2006, p. 43) is somewhat more cautious, admitting that we 
shouldn’t expect imagery to share neural substrates with vision that are involved 
in organizing immediate sensory input. Nonetheless, Goldman claims, like Nanay 
and Clark, that his version of perceptualism is supported on neuropsychological 
grounds, citing “substantial similarity between the neural substrates of vision and 
visual imagery.”
Strikingly, many studies by neuropsychologists report not just that mental 
imagery makes use of circuits in visual areas of the brain, but that it uses circuitry 
in V1 in particular (see Kosslyn et al. 2001, Pearson et al. 2015 and Dijkstra et al. 
2019 for reviews). This is startling. V1 is the brain’s primary visual cortex, the 
physical organisation of which is ‘retinotopic’ (Holmes, 1918; Horton & Hoyt, 
1991). This means that activation patterns in V1 preserve, with only minor spatial 
deformation, the patterns of stimulation observed at the retina. As a result, some 
have claimed that V1 is literally depictive of visual input, and that space on the 
visual cortex represents space in the world no less than the retina does (Kosslyn 
et al. 2006, p. 100). If the neural substrates of vision and mental imagery overlap 
so as to include V1, then this would seem considerable support for perceptualism.
Now, one way to push back would be to grant these empirical claims, but deny 
the inference from sameness of neural substrate to sameness of psychological 
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kind. Peter Langland-Hassan (2015, p. 669) pursues this strategy, pointing out 
that the brain may use the same neural circuitry for functionally distinct tasks. 
Along similar lines, it has recently been argued in the neuroscience literature, 
apparently in direct contrast to Clark’s remarks, that sameness of vision/imagery 
substrate fails to establish an identity of processing, since sameness of neural 
substrate is compatible with a difference in performed computation (Thorudottir 
et al. 2020).
But the claim that perception and imagery do, in fact, share neural substrates, 
at least as far as V1 is concerned, is one that we should not automatically grant. 
Although numerous philosophers follow Nanay, Clark and Goldman in claiming that 
neuropsychology has proven that V1 is among imagery’s neural substrate, there are 
several controversies surrounding this matter which the philosophical literature has 
so far overlooked or ignored. Two recent meta-analyses of fMRI-based research on 
mental imagery are clear about how contentious the matter is. Far from championing 
V1 as a significant substrate of imagery, the first claims that research here is beset 
by “inconsistent findings and contested interpretations.” (Winlove et al. 2018, p. 18) 
The other points to clinical findings “at odds with models [of imagery] proposing a 
crucial implication of early visual areas” (Spagna et al. 2021, p. 202) In closing, I 
will review some of the findings in this area in an attempt to defuse the shared neu-
ral substrate argument for perceptualism. To be clear: I won’t be arguing that these 
findings show that V1 is definitely not part of imagery’s neural substrate. Although 
I will be arguing that we have reason to take anti-V1 clinical results in this area 
more seriously than pro-V1 experimental results, the chief  aim is simply  to show 
the extent to which the shared neural substrate argument rests upon empirical prem-
ises that are highly disputed.14 As such, philosophers should be more cautious when 
advancing the argument.
5.1  Inconsistent findings
First, what are the inconsistent findings that Winlove et al. (2018) believe are present 
in the literature? Four are particularly striking. First, a number of experimental stud-
ies, almost half in their meta-analysis, reported that V1 was not active in imagery-
based tasks, suggesting that V1 activation, although often present, is “not essential” 
(p. 18) for imagery. Second, Winlove and their collaborators found that V1 was only 
reliably activated in studies where subjects were instructed to close their eyes (p. 
10). When neuroimaging studies on V1′s role in imagery-generation were first per-
formed, enforcing an eyes-closed condition was thought necessary to rule out that 
V1 circuitry was being activated by external stimuli. But the fact that this condition 
is correlated with increased activation of V1 circuitry, a result replicated elsewhere 
(Costumero et al. 2020), is puzzling. Indeed, when combined, these first two find-
ings suggest that current neuropsychology remains somewhat in the dark about not 
14 By way of example, see the recent exchange in Nature Neuroscience between Bartolomeo et al. (2020) 




only V1′s role in imagery generation, but also the nature of V1′s functional con-
nectivity more generally. Third, many early attempts to study imagery’s neural sub-
strate, and which were responsible for optimism about V1′s necessity for imagery, 
relied on brain activity measures that would be considered “inappropriately lenient” 
(p. 8) by today’s standards.15 Fourth, neuroimaging studies of V1 activity during 
imagery tasks often have small sample sizes (p. 7). As such, we should be cautious 
in inferring that any statistically significant result entails a real effect (see also But-
ton et al. 2013); a small sample size entails that minor or even spurious variations 
between subjects will have a disproportionate influence on overall results.
5.2  Clinical findings
Winlove et al. are concerned by methodological difficulties in the experimental lit-
erature. But we might worry that they fail to pinpoint specific failings in this area. 
Spagna et al. (2021) approach the V1 controversy from a different angle. They are 
concerned to highlight observations of brain-damaged patients in clinical contexts 
that are “sharply discordant” (p. 202) with the experimental results yielded from the 
study of healthy, neurotypical subjects, and which supposedly show the necessity of 
V1 for imagery.
Spagna and colleagues call the view that V1 is a shared vision/imagery sub-
strate the “dominant model,” and note that it predicts the systematic co-occurrence 
vision/imagery deficits. The thought is this: if V1 is a shared vision/imagery sub-
strate, then we should observe only coinciding vision/imagery impairments; there 
should not be observations of impaired imagery functions co-present with normal 
visual functions and vice versa. However, there is “extensive evidence” (p. 213) of 
vision/imagery double dissociations from observations of brain damaged patients, 
and which Spagna and colleagues use to argue that mental imagery “does not need 
activity in early visual areas.” (Ibid.) (They ultimately argue that circuitry in the pre-
frontal cortex is the neural substrate of visual mental imagery, rather than areas in 
the occipital cortex, where V1 and related early visual areas are located.)
Two kinds of vision/imagery double dissociations found in the clinical literature 
bear on this discussion. Reflection on them can be used to flesh out the above claims 
by Spagna et al. (2021).
First, vision and visual imagery are doubly dissociable at a global, course-grained 
level. On the one hand, congenitally, totally blind individuals have been observed 
to be “well able” to perform visual imagery tasks (Aleman et al. 2001, p. 2603; see 
also Chatterjee & Southwood 1995). On the other, aphantasic subjects, who lack 
mental imagery either congenitally or as a result brain damage, can have normal 
visual abilities.16 (Zeman et al. 2015).
16 It is sometimes claimed that aphantasics lack only voluntary imagery; this won’t matter for my pur-
poses.
15 Winlove and their collaborators do not specify which studies they have in mind. However, the most 
well-known early advocate of V1 as being part of imagery’s neural substrate is Stephen Kosslyn, whose 
research is approvingly cited by Nanay (p. 67 and p. 73) and Goldman (p. 43).
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Cases of ‘pure’ aphantasia following brain damage, i.e. without other impair-
ments, are rare. But examples do exist. For instance, one patient, described by Moro 
et al. (2008, p. 112), acquired aphantasia following brain damage and, despite being 
unable to imagine objects, was fully able to navigate their environment and visually 
identify objects, showing “no apparent impairments in their visual perceptual abili-
ties.” Thus Moro and their collaborators claim the case provides evidence of “a very 
clear dissociation” between vision and visual imagery.
A second patient with acquired aphantasia, R.M., reported by Farah et al. (1988), 
retained “good” (p. 161) visual object-recognition abilities, while being unable to 
imagine objects.17 Strikingly, both patients, through losing their capacity for mental 
imagery, exhibited what seem best described, from a philosophical perspective, as 
cognitive deficits rather than perceptual ones. The patient reported on by Moro and 
their collaborators had difficulty with practical reasoning, being unable to choose 
which snack to order when food was out of sight, but not, crucially, when placed 
before them (2008, p. 112). R.M. on the other hand had difficulty representing to 
themselves certain relational facts about types of objects, being unable to judge the 
truth value of so-called Eddy and Glass sentences (Eddy & Glass, 1981). These are 
sentences thought to require imagery for verification, e.g., “A grapefruit is larger 
than an orange,” in contrast with those that seemingly do not, and which R.M. was 
perfectly capable of verifying via semantic memory, e.g., “Animals are stuffed by a 
taxidermist.” (p. 153).
The study of aphantasia is in its infancy, and several unresolved issues surround 
its connection to memory, dreaming and creativity (Dawes et al. 2020; Zeman et al. 
2020; see also Whiteley forthcoming) But aphantasia’s relevance for debates about 
the neural substrate of imagery is clear enough. As authors of one of the first, large-
scale studies of the condition put it:
[Aphantasia] suggests perception and imagery do not rely upon identical neu-
ral substrates and representations [and] acts as further evidence towards a 
growing body of work demonstrating key differences between imagery and 
perception. (Bainbridge et al. 2021, p. 160)
The shared neural substrate argument advanced by Nanay, Clark, Goldman and oth-
ers, would thus seem to be severely undermined by the condition.
Second, and at a more domain-specific, fine-grained level, the following vision/
imagery dissociations have been observed in clinical contexts:
• impairment to colour imagery, despite normal colour perception (De Vreese, 
1991),
• impairment to colour vision, despite normal colour imagery (Bartolomeo et al. 
1997),
• impairment to the ability to identify words and numbers via imagery, but not per-
ception (Bartolomeo et al. 1998); and
17 This was not, strictly speaking, a ‘pure’ case due to the patient’s verbal alexia (p. 162), an inability to 
read whole words, and from which the clinicians inferred an attentional deficit.
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• impairment to the ability to identify words and numbers via perception, but not 
imagery (Sirigu & Duhamel, 2001).
As one clinical review puts it, “every type of dissociation is possible” between 
vision and visual imagery (Bartolomeo, 2002, p. 372). This is not what should be 
observed, if V1 and other early visual areas of the brain are among the neural sub-
strate of imagery.
It might be replied that these deficits are consistent with imagery and percep-
tion sharing a neural substrate. ‘Perceptual’ and ‘imagistic’ might simply be differ-
ent ways of describing the same circuitry, bottom-up when perceptual and top-down 
when imagistic. What has gone wrong when, say, colour imagery is impaired, but 
colour perception is intact, might be that there is damage to top-down pathways that 
activate the substrate in question, with the bottom-up pathways remaining intact.
Something like the above may lurk in the back of Nanay’s characterisation of 
mental imagery as “perceptual processing that is not triggered by corresponding 
sensory stimulation in a given sense modality.” (2018, p. 127) Indeed, one can find 
neuropsychologists who defend the idea that imagery processing is just perceptual 
processing inverted (Dijkstra, 2020; see Pearson, 2019, pp. 625–626 for discussion). 
However, the idea that imagery processing is simply a ‘reversed visual hierarchy’ is 
controversial. Even Stephen Kosslyn and his collaborators, one of the chief champi-
ons of V1′s role in imagery generation, seemingly walks back some of his claims in 
the face of clinical evidence of imagery/perception dissociations, cautioning against 
the view that imagery “is simply perception in the absence of immediate stimuli.” 
(2006, p. 151) As Kosslyn notes, the sum total of the extant empirical literature, 
where this includes observations of brain-damaged patients, “paints a more complex 
picture.”
Recently, Nanay (2021) has claimed that we should not necessarily think of 
aphantasics as lacking mental imagery (or lacking in the ability to intentionally 
generate mental imagery). This is because some aphantasics seem to lack only con-
scious imagery. Imagery may remain, just unconsciously. Why think this? Nanay 
points to a case of at least one aphantasic performing just as well as non-aphanta-
sics on an imagery-related task, despite having no conscious imagery (Jacobs et al. 
2018).
Now, construing aphantasia as a lack of conscious mental imagery, but with 
intact unconscious imagery, may offer the perceptualist a reply to the second line of 
objection developed above, i.e. which appealed to fine-grained imagery/perception 
dissociations. The reply might be that it has not been ruled out that the observed 
‘dissociation’ of, e.g., colour imagery and colour vision, is not really a mere deficit 
of introspection; that is, what is lost in aphantasia is an inability to introspect a pro-
cessing event as mental imagery while the ability to introspect it as perceptual expe-
rience remains intact. On this account, imagery and perception do not themselves 
dissociate, rather there is a problem of ‘access’ to what we can think of as one side 
of the imagery/perceptual processing coin.
This reply is not without its problems. For one, it still postulates a dissociation, 
only at the level of imagery/perception introspection rather than imagery/perception 
processing. This may not itself be problematic. However, the devil is in the details, 
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since the reply requires substantial empirical assumptions about the ways that intro-
spection can break down. In particular, an account is owed of how introspection can 
be neglectful in the relevant manner. How are introspective processes able to discern 
visual experience of colour, but not imagery experience of colour (or vice versa) 
though both are allegedly constituted by the same processing events?
Even with this issue solved, construing (at least some) cases of aphantasia as a 
mere loss of conscious imagery does not help with the first objection developed 
above. When the patients described by Moro et  al. and Farah et  al. lost mental 
imagery, what was thereby affected was nothing perceptual, but something wholly 
cognitive: practical reasoning (the patient who was indecisive about which snack to 
order) and difficulty forming beliefs about object types and their relational proper-
ties (R.M. performing an Eddy & Glass sentence verification test). Understanding 
aphantasia as a loss of access to imagery does not speak to this objection to percep-
tualism. For the objection is that perceptualism gets wrong what kind of mental state 
or processing imagery is in the first place, never mind issues of consciousness versus 
unconsciousness (see also Cavedon-Taylor forthcoming).
In sum, current neuropsychology is equivocal at best on whether V1 is part of the 
neural substrate of mental imagery. In particular, one is liable to get a very different 
answer, depending on whether one asks an experimental or clinical neuropsycholo-
gist, even putting aside the inconsistencies in the experimental literature that Win-
love et al. highlight.
I say that neuropsychology is equivocal here ‘at best’ because, ultimately, we have 
reason to take the anti-V1 clinical findings more seriously than the pro-V1 experi-
mental findings. For what the experimental, i.e. brain-imaging, literature can reveal 
is only the correlation of brain activity with task performance. (In the case of MRI, 
this means the occurrence of blood-oxygen-level-dependent events.) Crucially, what 
this can’t show is whether the circuits activated are directly causally responsible for 
that performance, even when neural activity is observed to go above a baseline rest-
ing state. For one, increased activity in V1 circuits during imagery tasks may be a 
result of the brain’s suppressing visual activity, particularly in eyes-open conditions 
(Pylyshyn, 2002, p. 224; Fidelman, 1994). This would render increased activity in 
V1 during imagery tasks a mere enabling condition of imagery generation, rather 
than an activity in the brain that is directly causally relevant for imagery’s instantia-
tion. To investigate the locale of imagery’s neutral substrate, understood as a true 
difference-maker rather than a mere enabling condition for that substrate (or simply 
an epiphenomenal concomitant or ‘hanger-on’), we need dissociations rather than 
correlations. As Bartolomeo and colleagues recently put it:
Where does the discrepancy between the neuroimaging and [clinical] findings 
come from? The neuroimaging results supporting the hypothesis of an impli-
cation of early visual areas are correlative in nature, whereas deficits in people 
with brain injury demonstrate a causal contribution of the lesioned circuits to 
the relevant cognitive ability. (2020, p. 517)
The point is that what bears most directly on whether imagery shares a neural sub-
strate with vision and visual experience is whether there are dissociations between 
the two, and not, crucially, whether they are co-present in healthy subjects.
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Why is that? An analogy might be instructive: the fact minds are observed, 
in actuality, to be correlated with brains is neither here nor there for whether 
mind–body dualism is true. For what bears on the question of dualism is whether 
mind and brain can dissociate (as a matter of metaphysical possibility). The question 
is not whether there is, in actual fact, a separation, but whether the two are separa-
ble. Likewise, the observed correlation of V1 activity with performance on imagery 
tasks in brain imaging studies does not settle V1′s necessity for mental imagery. 
Like the question of mind–body dualism, the question of whether V1 is a part of 
imagery’s neural substrate also boils down to whether a kind of separation is possi-
ble (albeit, in this case, nomologically). Clinical neuropsychology, and in particular 
the study of aphantasia, supplies evidence that it is.
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